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The detention of Samruk-Kazyna’s chief executive and the head of Kazakhstan’s national railway company on November 11, 2026, has thrown a spotlight on the holding company that controls the country’s most strategically important enterprises — from oil fields and uranium mines to railways and the electricity grid. By the end of 2025, the fund managed approximately $88 billion in assets and employed more than 254,000 people across 326 companies.

Kazakhstan’s anti-corruption service, operating under the National Security Committee, detained Nurlan Zhakupov, who had led Samruk-Kazyna since April 2023, and Yelzhas Otynshiyev, who had headed the national railway operator Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) since July 2026 after previously holding senior positions at the fund itself. An investigating court authorised pretrial detention for both men on November 14. The specific allegations have not been disclosed, and neither man has been found guilty by a court.

At a Security Council meeting on November 13, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev described the case as a serious indicator of the scale of corruption inside state-owned companies and warned of reputational damage to Kazakhstan. He instructed the government to submit proposals for reducing corruption risks in state-owned firms by November 24. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov, who chairs the fund’s board of directors, told investors and creditors on November 18 that Samruk-Kazyna would maintain its investment programmes and meet financial obligations on time, and pledged stronger board oversight, improved internal audits and tighter anti-corruption safeguards. A new chief executive is to be appointed.

From Crisis Vehicle to Industrial Conglomerate

Samruk-Kazyna was created in October 2008, at the initiative of then-president Nursultan Nazarbayev, through the merger of the state holding company Samruk and the Kazyna Sustainable Development Fund. The timing was deliberate: Kazakhstan’s banking and construction sectors had been badly hit by the global financial crisis, and by November 2008 the government had designated the new entity as the principal vehicle for a $10 billion anti-crisis programme. A separate law governing the fund was adopted in February 2012; the Kazakh government remains its sole shareholder.

In May 2013, Nazarbayev signed a decree establishing the Baiterek National Managing Holding, which absorbed ten development institutions previously managed by government agencies and Samruk-Kazyna. That separation gave Baiterek responsibility for development finance and left Samruk-Kazyna focused on managing operating businesses — a distinction that matters for understanding how the fund works. Unlike sovereign wealth funds that invest government financial reserves, Samruk-Kazyna runs companies that are expected to be commercially efficient while simultaneously carrying out government mandates, including infrastructure projects with long payback periods.

The fund wholly owns KTZ, gas company QazaqGaz, power company Samruk-Energy, postal operator Kazpost, and mining company Tau-Ken Samruk. It holds controlling stakes in national grid operator KEGOC, Kazakhtelecom, oil and gas producer KazMunayGas, and Kazatomprom — the world’s largest uranium producer. In 2025, the group’s combined annual revenue reached approximately $36 billion.

A February 2026 study by International Monetary Fund economists Dyna Heng and Thomas Piontek found that Samruk-Kazyna’s assets at the end of 2024 were equivalent to 31 percent of Kazakhstan’s gross domestic product, while its debt amounted to roughly 12 percent of GDP. KazMunayGas alone accounted for approximately half of the holding company’s total assets. The IMF economists warned that the fund and similar state holding companies finance government programmes outside the national budget; if their balance-sheet expansion were counted as public spending, Kazakhstan’s non-oil fiscal deficit would have been about 3.5 percentage points of GDP higher in 2024–2025 than official figures showed. They called for greater scrutiny of this off-budget spending.

A Record of Governance Failures

The arrests did not emerge from a clean institutional record. Kazakhstan’s Supreme Audit Chamber published findings on November 28, 2025, identifying substantial shortcomings in the fund’s operations. The fund’s 2018–2021 transformation programme — intended to bring eight companies’ efficiency in line with international peers — failed to meet its objective; the economic benefits amounted to approximately $300 million, roughly half the projected figure. At the time of the audit, 41 of the group’s companies had recorded losses in 2024. Three of the five committees of the fund’s board of directors were inactive, including those responsible for strategy and oversight of the transformation programme. Financial statements at several enterprises were still being prepared manually. An audit of 18 legal entities identified 119 systemic shortcomings and inefficient use of funds amounting to approximately $235 million.

Procurement practices present a separate concern. The group operates its own electronic procurement platform, Samruk-Kazyna Contract. In 2025, group companies awarded approximately $7.7 billion in procurement contracts; around $4.8 billion, or 62 percent of the total, was awarded through single-source, noncompetitive procurement. Authorities have not said whether any of these findings are connected to the current criminal investigation. As early as 2024, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development had recommended greater board independence and more transparent senior appointments at state-owned companies, and called for the costs of government mandates to be accounted for separately from commercial operations.

Following the mass unrest of January 2022, Tokayev had already called for a fundamental overhaul of Samruk-Kazyna, and the fund’s management board approved a new organisational structure in January of that year that included major cuts to management and administrative staff. The latest arrests suggest those reforms did not resolve the underlying governance problems.

Reform Debate and the Railway IPO

One of the fund’s most closely watched upcoming projects is KTZ’s planned initial public offering. Even before Otynshiyev’s arrest, the railway company’s prospects for a stock market debut were being assessed against a growing debt burden. Former KTZ public relations director Murat Buldekbayev, speaking on November 18, said the company’s financial position and ability to service its debt mattered more to prospective investors than the prosecution of individual executives, and identified frequent management changes as a persistent corporate governance problem.

Kazakh economist Arman Beisembayev, speaking to Deutsche Welle on November 16, advocated gradually reducing state involvement in certain industries and expanding private sector participation. Financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov described restructuring Samruk-Kazyna and revising its asset management principles as a more realistic option than dismantling the holding company altogether. Bektenov’s announced measures focus on oversight and internal controls; he did not announce changes to the holding company’s structure or its procurement system.

The partial opening of the state-owned sector to private capital has been one tangible outcome of the fund’s existence: shares in KazTransOil, KEGOC, Kazatomprom, KazMunayGas, and Air Astana were offered to investors between 2012 and 2024, expanding the investor base and increasing financial disclosure requirements. Whether the latest crisis accelerates or stalls that process will depend on decisions that Tokayev’s government has yet to announce.

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Javohir focuses on Uzbekistan's business environment, state-owned companies, financial regulation and the relationship between public institutions and private enterprise.