Listen to the article
Kazakhstan formally asked Russia in early November to restore oil deliveries to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline, which Moscow suspended on May 1 citing unspecified technical constraints. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said he delivered the request personally on November 4. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said on November 6 that no deliveries to Germany were planned via Druzhba for November or December, but that resumption could be considered if the technical restrictions were resolved and transport conditions secured.
The suspension followed a period of expanding trade. Germany imported roughly 10.3 million metric tons of crude from Kazakhstan in 2025, according to UN Comtrade data. Of that, Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry puts Druzhba deliveries to the PCK refinery at Schwedt at 2.1 million tons — a significant but partial share of the total. The pipeline’s closure has therefore disrupted one channel while others remain open.
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Chancellor Friedrich Merz had discussed increasing Kazakhstani oil supplies to Germany at a September 29 meeting in Berlin. Merz described Kazakhstani crude as a means of diversifying supplies after Germany stopped buying Russian oil. The shared interest in reliable transit gives Berlin a reason to examine whether it can help finance the infrastructure needed to make that trade more resilient.
Purchase Commitments and the Rosneft Trusteeship
In October 2025, KazMunayGas extended its supply agreement with Rosneft Deutschland through the end of 2026, with monthly deliveries from Karachaganak Petroleum Operating resources rising from 100,000 to 130,000 tons. Russia’s Druzhba suspension followed in May 2026 despite that purchasing commitment, illustrating the gap between commercial agreements and physical transit access.
The German government’s trusteeship over Rosneft Deutschland and RN Refining and Marketing, exercised through the Bundesnetzagentur, was extended indefinitely in February 2026. This gives Berlin a direct role on the purchasing side: it could encourage the companies to negotiate longer supply commitments with Kazakhstani producers and bring pipeline operators into those negotiations alongside buyers and sellers.
Germany has budgeted €400 million for 2025–2029 to upgrade the Rostock–Schwedt pipeline and the port of Rostock and to adapt both for processing non-Russian crudes. However, the Finance Ministry’s June 2026 monitoring report stated that no funds had been spent under the programme in 2025 and noted delays in the European Commission’s state-aid approval process.
Alternative Routes and Their Constraints
Kazakhstani oil also travels across the Caspian Sea to Baku and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. KazMunayGas’s annual report identifies ongoing work with Azerbaijan’s SOCAR to reduce tariffs, improve transparency of charges, and assess how Kazakhstani crude affects the Azeri Light blend. Renewed talks on higher volumes were reported in November. Tariff negotiations and crude-quality questions would directly affect the delivered price for German buyers.
A route combining Caspian transit, BTC, and onward tanker shipment to Gdańsk or Rostock would reach Schwedt without crossing Russian territory. By contrast, oil transported via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium route and shipped by tanker from Novorossiysk would still rely on Russian transit. Germany’s access to Polish pipeline capacity through the Gdańsk–Płock line also depends on other refineries’ requirements; the German government estimated that line’s capacity at about 30 million tons annually in August, but actual utilization figures remain commercially confidential.
PCK said on October 28 that replacement crude supplies had been secured despite the Druzhba interruption and that the refinery was operating above 86% of capacity. The cost of the replacement oil was not disclosed.
Where German Finance Rules Apply — and Where They Stop
KfW IPEX-Bank, the international project and export finance arm of Germany’s state development bank, offers pre-export financing against future commodity revenues. Its September 2026 guidelines permit such trade finance to include crude oil sales within portfolio limits. However, its ordinary financing rules exclude crude oil pipelines and terminals.
Germany’s untied loan guarantee scheme applies separate criteria. Crude oil is normally excluded because Germany considers supplies obtainable through a functioning global market without additional state backing. The EU’s Trans-European Networks for Energy framework separately excludes new oil infrastructure from its own support arrangements.
Any selective financial advantage granted through state resources could constitute state aid under EU rules if it distorts competition and affects trade between member states, requiring notification to and approval from the European Commission before implementation — unless an exemption or existing authorisation applies. KfW’s guidelines do permit exceptions to ordinary financing restrictions for certain federally mandated transactions or financing explicitly requested by the responsible ministry on behalf of the federal government, though EU requirements would still apply.
The Calculus for Berlin
Refiners such as PCK must weigh any reduction in disruption risk against potentially higher delivery costs and the constraints of long-term purchase commitments. Financial guarantees can cover specified losses or borrowing risks but cannot ensure physical delivery. Buyers would also need to assess the vulnerabilities of any alternative route.
Berlin could encourage longer purchase commitments, help negotiate transit access with Warsaw, or support a specific transport investment where financing rules permitted. Commitments from companies and other participating governments would establish how much of the cost and risk they were prepared to share. The German government would then have to judge whether more secure supplies for German buyers and more reliable market access for Kazakhstan justified its own financial exposure — weighed against the alternative supplies already available and the disruption risks that would remain along any proposed route.