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Compliance and anti-corruption officers embedded inside Uzbekistan’s state agencies face an obvious structural tension: they answer directly to the very officials whose conduct they are meant to scrutinise, and they draw their salaries from the same institutions. A model regulation governing internal anti-corruption control units in state bodies, state-owned enterprises and organisations addresses that tension through three concrete mechanisms designed to limit the leverage any single manager can exercise over the staff watching them.

No Performance Targets, No Unilateral Dismissals

The first protection is a blanket prohibition on applying key performance indicators to the heads and staff of internal anti-corruption control units. The logic is straightforward: KPIs are a standard management tool, and their absence removes one channel through which an agency chief could reward compliance with pressure or penalise inconvenient findings without ever issuing an explicit order.

The second mechanism requires that any disciplinary action against compliance unit staff be agreed in advance with the Anti-Corruption Agency. The provision is aimed squarely at preventing retaliatory punishment — the scenario in which an officer who identifies a corrupt practice or delivers a critical assessment of institutional shortcomings is subsequently subjected to disciplinary proceedings that appear procedurally legitimate but are substantively motivated by the findings themselves.

The third and perhaps most structurally significant rule concerns appointments and dismissals. The hiring, removal and competitive selection for vacant posts within these units must also be coordinated with the Agency. By inserting an external body into personnel decisions, the regulation prevents an agency head from simply replacing an inconvenient compliance officer through a unilateral administrative act.

The Gap the Rules Are Trying to Close

The question of whether these protections are sufficient was put directly to the Anti-Corruption Agency by Dostonbek Ahrorov of the Kun.uz news outlet, who noted that subordination to the host institution’s leadership and dependence on its payroll could obstruct impartial work and make it harder for officers to openly flag their superiors’ mistakes. The Agency’s response pointed to the three mechanisms in the model regulation as the operative answer, without claiming they eliminate the structural dependency entirely.

The regulation’s protections apply across state bodies and organisations as well as enterprises with state participation — a broad category in an economy where the government retains significant ownership stakes. Whether the coordination requirement with the Agency functions as a genuine check in practice, or becomes a formality, will depend on how consistently the Agency exercises its role in contested personnel decisions.

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Dilshod focuses on regional administration, local government decisions and publicly funded development projects across Uzbekistan, with particular attention to their effects on local communities.